rather too clever. They engaged the psychologist Oskar Pfungst to study the horse further. Using a double-blind technique, Pfungst discovered that Hans was 'reading' the tension in his audience: when he reached the correct number of taps, the observers unwittingly relaxed.
Animals like Hans learn, but what does this ability to benefit from experience tell us about cognition? Does the learning involve understanding? Ivan Pavlov stumbled on the apparent key to this facet of the animal mind in 1903 in the course of his studies of digestion. He found that, once they had learned a predictive cue, dogs would begin salivating for food before it appeared. The dog innately recognizes food by an unconditioned stimulus, US (probably odor or taste), which immediately triggers an innate unconditioned response, UR (salivation): US→UR. In time, a previously meaningless conditioning stimulus (CS), presented with or just before the US, comes to release the behavior: CS+US→UR, then CS→UR. For Hans, the relaxation of tension had been the CS. The learning is automatic: no comprehension is necessary.
In 1912, J.B. Watson proposed that all behavior -human or animal -is compounded of USs, their URs, and the automatic correlation process that we now call classical, or Pavlovian, conditioning. In Watson's view, we are the products of our conditioning, romantically imagining that we have independent thought. His school of psychology, Behaviorism, came to dominate the study of behavior in the United States for the next 60 years.
Watson's idea that novel behavior was created by chaining URs together was challenged two decades later by B.F. Skinner, who argued that humans and animals discover new ways of doing things by trial-and-error learning. The feedback from an innately defined goal allows an automatic correlation process to fine-tune the animal's efforts. The third major shock came in 1966 when John Garcia discovered rapid food-avoidance conditioning. This kind of one-trial learning violates many of the rules of classical conditioning: the cues that can be learned are strictly limited, the association is not forgotten or reversible, and the UR can follow the CS+US experience by many hours. Suddenly the link between imprinting and classical conditioning became clear: learning can be controlled by instinct. Subsequent work revealed a host of such sensory biases in rats and pigeons, and then similar prejudices in operant conditioning in the same species. In most cases, these 'anomalies' seem to focus the animal's attention on the cues or body parts most likely to be relevant to the learning task at hand. Clearly natural selection should favor such biases if they tend to make the learning quicker and more reliable, and this is just the sort of innate guidance ethologists had been reporting for decades.
The final blow came in 1976 with David Olton's work on rats in eightarm mazes. He showed that his animals create mental maps of the maze as they explore it, and can refer back to these unreinforced experiences days later. Indeed, a consistent pattern of having underestimated the mental powers of lab animals emerges from the studies that have followed. In one example, mice were allowed unreinforced inspection of an unbelievably complex maze, which required more than 1200 correct turns to solve efficiently. All mice, for no apparent reason, were running this path perfectly within three days. Or to take another case (discussed more later), pigeons were able to learn the concept of 'tree' faster than the distinction between two very different colors.
In the same year, a deeply subversive book by Donald Griffin appeared: The Question of Animal Awareness. For more than 60 years this topic had been off limits, and most of us had forgotten that there even was such a question. The response was mostly one of outrage and shock, but within a few years Griffin's continuing salvoes had generated considerable interest, reinspection and analysis of old data, and new experiments. By the time of his death in 2003, Griffin had created a vigorous new field of animal behavior -one which is now so crowded with evidence that some of us have begun to wonder if animals are not, once again, in danger of being thought too clever.
One of the problems endemic to research on animal cognition is the ability of natural selection to create behavior of astonishing complexity and suitability to a problem. For instance, so far as we know, all bird nests are built on the basis of innate instructions: a 'to-do' list specifying construction materials and methods. True, birds typically get better with experience, but an attempt to create a bird's nest by hand will convince anyone that the amount of trial-and-error learning needed to do the job even badly requires far too much valuable time in the breeding season.
So when an animal does something apparently clever, the first question to ask is whether this might be part of its natural repertoire. Is the intelligence genuine -an ability to create a novel solution in the mind -or is it a trick being played on an all-toogullible audience of humans? The answer requires knowing the natural history of the species, and One suggestion for measuring animal intelligence is to look at learning rates or memory capacity. But the numbers tell us that some animals must be smarter than humans at certain tasks. For instance, a human can remember perhaps a dozen places he has hidden food, whereas various caching birds regularly memorize hundreds or even thousands of locations. Or if we ask how many trials are needed to achieve an 80% success rate on a two-color discrimination task, we find that goldfish need 4 exposures, pigeons 10, rats 22, and fivemonth-old humans 28; honey bees require 2 trials. Clearly the idea that brain size and learning are correlated has no predictive value on these measures for these commonly tested species.
Or consider mental rotation, a component of human 'intelligence' tests -one on which men do substantially better than women. A look at the data reveals that the time required to decide if a particular figure is a rotation of another depends on the angle of rotation (up to 180° The subsequent discovery that even honey bees spontaneously form concepts, however, has taken much of the force from this work. Edward Wasserman accounts for concept formation as an extension of classical conditioning, which is not unreasonable if we assume that the association probabilitiesboth negative and positive -of dozens of factors can be processed simultaneously. This is just what neural-net models assume, and here, finally, may be some reason to take them seriously. Selection should certainly have favored concept formation in many species; the fact that it is so widespread a feature suggests that animals may be programmed to look for more information than experimenters are in the habit of providing. If so, not only is concept formation not particularly cognitive, but we have been inadvertently making animals look stupid.
The route planning that Tolman uncovered and Olton made famous is another ability that may look more impressive than it is. Most of us can close our eyes and reconstruct the direction to an unseen target, or devise in our heads a novel and indirect route. So too, it would seem, can chimpanzees, dogs, rats and many birds. What is necessary is a knowledge of the surroundings, and useful landmarks to tell you where you are when the problem needs to be solved. But these abilities all map to a small area of the hippocampus in mammals, which suggests a piece of dedicated circuitry for this important class of behavior. Honey bees and hunting spiders are at least as good as many vertebrates. It is not hard to imagine a built-in program for making and using maps, while it is difficult to think of a way of disproving this alternative (or of some compelling reason natural selection would not have created such wiring).
Examples of apparent invention in nature bring us closer to animal intelligence: they are rare, but all the more remarkable (and less likely to be hard-wired). For instance, the practice of using bait to lure fish has been discovered by a handful of herons in widely separated parts of the globe. Bernd Heinrich hand-reared a group of ravens and then confronted them with a series of novel problems involving meat suspended from a branch by a piece of string. Initial attempts to snatch the meat on the wing were unsuccessful, and the birds eventually stopped trying. Later, with no preamble, one bird flew to the branch, reached down and pulled up the string, stepped on it, pulled up some more, and so on until it had the food.
Some (but not all) of the other birds subsequently solved the problem (apparently independently) in slightly different ways. This ability to devise a behavioral solution in the mind before applying the strategy in the real world -what I call mental trialand-error -seems a key piece of evidence for thinking. If we know the natural history of the species and the past experience of the individuals, it is difficult to think of an explanation that does not involve understanding -and follow-up tests with stones and crossed strings seem to confirm this view for the ravens.
Another kind of behavior that seems to impress our species is abstract reasoning. Perhaps the most even-handed thing that can be said about cognitive ethology is that it has made animals look smarter and humans dumber than either group formerly appeared. Individual opinion differs on where to draw the line on thinking, but it seems clear that much of what we once took to be cognitive and largely human now appears to be widespread and at least partially innate. The power of automatic learning (in humans as well as animals) is much greater than we had thought, while evolution seems to have smoothed the path to abilities once considered intellectually impressive.
Designing convincing tests requires knowing the natural history of a species, and the individual experience of each animal to be tested. Solving what are for the species and individual novel problems seems the best guide to animal thinking (and the most fruitful area of current research). The use of language or real-time TV images as tools, or guile as a strategy, are equally impressive windows into the animal mind, but this approach is limited to a narrow group of species -dolphins and apes. Niche challenges are especially critical in choosing animals for study and problems to offer: evolutionary necessity seems to have been the mother of cognitive invention; species that face frequent unpredictable challenges in nature are the ones in which a compensating ability to think and plan is most likely to have evolved.
